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A U.S. Homeland Security Strategy

The need for a secure society is one of the overriding needs of our time. However, a balance must be struck between security and liberty; two much of one has a tendency to negate the other. History has provided many examples of failed attempts to achieve this balance and the road is littered with good intentions gone bad. In our current times the debate on homeland security has become of paramount importance and a viable strategy must be put into place. Today, it is terrorism that stands as the greatest danger to our country's security.

As with all strategies there must be room for flexibility and the realization that certain situations may call for harsher measures; but it must be remembered that these situations can not last forever and the new strategy must reflect that (an example of this has been seen in the so-called "sunset" provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act, which requires some government powers to be periodically renewed by Congress). As Robert Dorff states, "given the nature of strategy, it must allow for significant flexibility and adaptation as one adjusts to the shifts in the strategic environment and the choices and actions made by other actors in that environment."[1]

The United States constitution states that the People of the US "in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, [2] It is these principles that drive the need to develop an effective homeland security strategy. Without security there can be no liberty. It should also be remembered that the Constitution is not inviolable, as evidenced from the creation of the Bill of Rights and the abolition of slavery. The laws of our past are a guide but we must also have the courage of our ancestors to decide what is right in our times. Thomas Hobbes states that when there is no strong central government "to overawe them all, " then "men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company."[3]

It is the government's responsibility to protect the people from all threats. To achieve this, the government must have a clear eyed view of what people are and what the state can be. The philosophy of Saint Augustine provides an answer. According to Augustinian philosophy, Tinder explains, "man is a dangerous being; existing social and political institutions may be imperfect, but insofar as they assure some kind of order, even if only through the pressures of habit and fear, they have some value."[4] However, while Augustine would suggest faith only in God, we should instead have faith in our government.

Robert Dorff explains that "in simple terms strategy is the calculated relationship among ends, ways, and means. Ends are the objectives or goals sought. Means are the resources available to pursue the objectives. And ways are the concepts or methods for how one organizes and applies the resources."[5] The ends are to achieve a secure society that can allow for a reasonable degree of liberty. The means are many and include all the resources the government has, such as the military, intelligence, the law, and the police. The ways are several and will be explained below. There is both an international and domestic aspect to the strategy. It is also important, when taking domestic security measures, to remember that, as Viotti states, "more than just assuring physical security, a comprehensive homeland security strategy also seeks to secure the liberties and rights the people hold dear."[6]

The United States faces many threats in today's world; however, few threats have been dealt with as poorly as the threat of terrorism. The majority of the solutions that have been implemented have been short term and ineffective. The battle against terrorism can not be fixed overnight; it will take many years and require a well thought out strategy. Further clarifying what is meant by strategy, Karl von Clausewitz states that it "maps out the plan of war, and to the aforesaid aim it affixes the series of acts which are to lead to it; that is, it makes the plans for the separate campaigns and arranges the engagements to be fought in each of them."[7] Sun-Tzu further clarifies the importance of an effective strategy by stating, "the expert at battle seeks his victory from strategic advantage and does not demand it from his men."[8] In order to deal with terrorism the US must look clearly at the problem and not allow its biases to color its strategy. As Machiavelli said, "the way men live is so far removed from the way they ought to live that anyone who abandons what is for what should be pursues his downfall rather than his preservation."[9] The United States must form a comprehensive strategy that is grounded in reality and devoid of any fancifulness.

Next, it is important to understand the causes underlying terrorism today; statements like "they hate us for our freedom" are no longer helpful (nor were they ever). The actions of the US must also be taken into account and analyzed in an unbiased manner to determine if there is a legitimate reason as to why some see US actions as the cause of terrorism. There is no one cause for terrorism, nor is it clear where the tipping point exists that triggers a person's transformation into a terrorist. However, there exists a number of fairly clear and agreed upon factors that lead to terrorism.

In his book, Dying to Win[10], Robert Pape discusses suicide terrorism. He believes that the main reasons for suicide terrorism stem from foreign occupation (or troop presence) of other countries or if the country's population believes that its government is propped up by a foreign country. This feeling is particularly inflamed if the country in question has a different religion than the predominant ones in the occupying country, such as Islam in Saudi Arabia. It is clear that the US is deeply involved within the Middle East and is generally seen as propping up corrupt governments to further its own interests in the region. The Bush government increased religious fears in the Middle East when after 9/11 the President referred to the US conducting a "crusade" in the region. Great care must be taken in the future not to make statements that feed into the already palpable fear of many in the region of a US desire for a religious war.

The growing US need for oil makes it hard to disentangle the country from the Middle East, but if alternative energy sources are explored further the US may be able to reduce its interference in the area. Another motivation to reduce oil consumption is the fact that some of the oil profits are being funneled to terrorist organizations. Terrorists are also driven by their grievances towards the impact of globalization on their societies; globalization generally being seen as a Western, primarily US, driven occurrence. Rapoport describes terrorism as a "religiously inspired fourth wave" based upon "anti-globalization...tension between the have and have-not nations...In an era where reforms occur at a pace much slower than is desired, terrorists...exploit the frustrations of the common people."[11] The US should increase its foreign aid programs and work to support international assistance programs that work to improve peoples' lives.

Clausewitz states that "no war is begun, or at least, no war should be begun, if people acted wisely, without first finding an answer to the question: what is to be attained by and in war?"[12] It is thus necessary to clearly define what the objectives for the US strategy against terrorism are. While terrorism can probably never be ended; there is no reason not to aim at substantially reducing the threat. The threat may seem like an insurmountable task, but as Machiavelli says "I estimate that even if fortune is the arbiter of half our actions, she still allows us to control the other half."[13] Thus there is no reason not to try our hardest to solve the problem, for fortune "submits more readily to boldness"[14] than to hopelessness.

Due to current threat of Islamic terrorist groups, the US must rethink its strategy in the Middle East. The time has come for the US to admit that it has made mistakes in the region and for it to reach out to the citizens in the area. This includes reaching out and talking to its enemies, whether this is a covert discussion through intermediaries or conducted openly by the State Department or something in between. The talks must occur if only to further understand the grievances of the other side (and to determine who the real power players in the area are). There is going to be a substantial amount of controversy involved in the decision to engage with our enemies, but the US has already tried not talking and its War on Terror has not advanced the fight against terrorism. It is also important to find ways to counter the ideological arguments and material benefits that terrorist organizations use to recruit and maintain followers.

A realistic determination must be made as to what capabilities the US has to find and destroy these organizations (i.e. the military or law enforcement and intelligence) and which, if any, would be the most effective (looking at both long term and short term gains). Before any action is taken it should be analyzed to determine if it will actually be effective or if it will strengthen the terrorists (as can be argued the Iraq war has). It will be necessary to, as Viotti explains, identify the "grievances a population may hold against the target toward which a terrorist group directs its violent actions." Next it is important to "identify the groups, movements, or insurgencies drawn from this population" and to specify "their links to each other and to the popular support each enjoys." Lastly it is important to have "effective counterstrategies [that] employ intelligence and other detection measures for early warning or, if possible, prevention of violent actions."[15]

Assassination, a controversial measure, must be brought back onto the table. It is often very difficult to capture a terrorist alive (without putting many of our own people at great peril), yet we cannot just wait for another opportune time to find the terrorist again. Assassination is morally justified due to the fact that it can actually reduce the number of deaths involved. If the leaders of a terrorist organization can all be taken out through a series of covert actions this will not put as many of our people at risk (and will be more cost-effective than an all out war, for example in Afghanistan). Assassination should only be used against high value targets (ex. Osama bin Laden) that have been clearly defined. The military and certain other agencies should be given the independent ability to target and kill high value targets if they are found. Albert Camus stated that "politics involves killing" and "you can rightfully sacrifice the life of another in a great political cause."[16] There is no greater cause than the protection of the United States.

Intelligence is key to creating a secure homeland. Intelligence must consist of both foreign and domestic collection. Foreign collection techniques are generally viewed as much less controversial, however, in the case of domestic collection many controversies arise. The Bill of Rights, Article 3, states, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...but upon probable cause."[17] This is a more than reasonable statement in theory, but it provides little context, it is thus necessary to define "probable cause" in flexible terms that will depend on the situation. In the case of a suspected terrorist, the probable cause threshold should be lowered due to the potentially catastrophic consequences of doing nothing. The use of the so called "sneak and peak" method should thus be used more freely in cases where the threat to the country is high. Also, due to the difficulty of gaining firsthand evidence/intelligence, evidence types such as "hearsay" should be admitted at the beginning of an investigation in order to widen the net of potential suspects.

Intelligence activities must be improved, in particular, human intelligence. As Sun-Tzu said, "the reason the farsighted ruler and his superior commander conquer the enemy at every move, and achieve successes far beyond the reach of the common crowd, is foreknowledge."[18] Most terrorist organizations have quickly grasped the fact that the US is heavily dependant on its technology to gather intelligence and have reacted by going low tech, thereby effectively nullifying the US's technological advantage. It is therefore essential that the US create a much more effective HUMINT program in order to infiltrate the societies and organizations where the threats originate from.

It is important that these HUMINT officers have knowledge of foreign languages or at least have the proficiency to learn more than one (the level of current language proficiency in US intelligence agencies is woefully low). It is helpful if the officer has lived in other countries or at least traveled extensively so as to build up knowledge of other cultures. This overseas experience helps to achieve an "empathetic analysis of an enemy and its strategy [which] is essential if counterstrategies are to have a chance of being effective."[19] Language proficiency is also an area where the recruitment of locals as officers can be very effective, since they will fit into the society much more easily. Locals will also look like the people in the community that they are working in; this is another benefit of using them. However, the use of locals or non-native born US citizens does raise the potential that the officers will have divided loyalties.

It will take time to build up a HUMINT organization that can meet the demands of today, so this is not an immediate solution but it is an important one, not just for the fight against terrorism, but to generate usable intelligence on all the threats and challenges that face the US now and in the future. As Sun-Tzu reminds us, "intelligence is of the essence in warfare - it is what the armies depend upon in their every move."[20]

Intelligence should be ethical, but only up to a point; certain scenarios may call for more extreme, morally hazy actions. For example, if there was a bomb that was going to go off in a US city and the CIA had captured one of the terrorists who could tell them where the bomb was so that they could defuse it; this would be a scenario where extreme measures would be called for.

Harsh interrogation (or enhanced interrogation), definitely a murky issue, would be called for in the ticking time-bomb scenario to obtain the necessary information. The United States has taken great pains to create a legal basis for enhanced interrogation techniques and the public must be made aware of this (as well as the information on the effectiveness of the techniques used). Harsh techniques should also be authorized against those detainees who have been trained to resist conventional interrogation techniques. It should be remembered that the international environment is very hazy morally and ethically and that good intentions are not enough to remain safe. There should be almost no constraints on what actions can be taken during crisis situations. However, no intelligence employee should be forced to do anything that he finds unethical. There should also be a time limit on the length of time that harsh interrogation practices can be used due to the deterioration of the value of intelligence over time. Harsh interrogation practices should be used incrementally; the interrogation should begin with basic interrogation, then if the subject resists the harshness of the techniques can be raised accordingly.

Ethics in intelligence is a balancing act, there should be a concerted effort to be ethical in all actions but intelligence operators must not be so constrained by rules and regulations that they are unable to effectively perform in their jobs. It is also important for an intelligence officer to be personally ethical and not let the "tyranny of the group" take away his personal responsibility. Another problem with ethics is that it often requires much more openness on the part of the intelligence community as to what its actions are, but one of the most important aspects of intelligence is its secrecy. A balance must be achieved between oversight and allowing the intelligence community to complete its job.

Most people assume that the CIA has often conducted its affairs in a less than moral way, but they do not make too much of a protest about it due to the fact that, for the most part, these actions take place abroad. There are also the obvious beneficial security implications of the actions taken, such as providing for the safety of US citizens, the economy, and the society's very way of life.

It is helpful, when deciding the morality of an action, to consider what might be the response of the American people if a certain action was made public. Of course, foreign policy should not be solely decided by popular opinion (especially if that opinion is uninformed), but it is a good thing to remember that intelligence officers, and the military, are representing their country and so should not act too far out from what the American people expect. However, shifting public opinions, such as those relating to enhanced interrogation techniques (there has been a growing acceptance of such techniques), should be taken into account when formulating policy.

As Viotti states in his book Terrorism and Homeland Security "the home game and the away game necessarily come together in any comprehensive strategy that includes both domestic and external courses of action."[21] It is also imperative that the strategies are tested by conducting exercises in order to reduce as much as possible what Clausewitz called "friction" and "the fog of war". As Clausewitz states, "everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction of which no one can form a correct idea who has not seen war."[22] Practice can help reduce these problems to some extent, but of course nothing compares to the real thing.

Viotti also explains that the strategist "needs always to be aware that there may be flaws in the causal analysis, not to mention data problems." The strategist needs to be aware of the potential for problems to occur and plan accordingly. Machiavelli explains further the need for the government (the Prince) to rehearse and study plans of action by stating that "he must never turn his attention away from military exercises. Indeed, he should devote himself to them in time of peace even more than in time of war; and he may do this in two ways: through action and through study."[23]

It is also essential to work productively with the countries where the threat originates from. Viotti states that "an important part of any strategy is working with (not dictating to) the political and other leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, or any society beset by political violence."[24] These leaders should include both governmental and non-governmental persons.

The military has proven to be largely ineffective at reducing the threat of terrorism; it is a blunt instrument (with the exception of special operations forces). This increases the legitimacy of the argument for other solutions to the problem, such as diplomacy. But if the chance appears to kill or capture terrorist leaders this should not be passed up, as long as the intelligence is reliable and civilian casualties are limited. But we do not necessarily need to be occupying a foreign country to be carrying out these actions. As Machiavelli said in reference to violence (or cruelty) "it can be said to be properly used when one resorts to it at one stroke out of a need for safety and does not thereafter insist upon it, but seeks instead to replace it with measures that are of the greatest possible use to [one's] subjects."[25] However, the US should also keep in mind the advice of Sun-tzu who said that, "to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all."[26] The US should also work with foreign countries to try and destroy safe havens (especially training grounds) for terrorists and to lessen open support for terrorist causes. If the US effectively works with other countries it will become much easier to prevent terrorists from moving freely around the world.

There must be continuing arms control programs that seek to prevent weapons, in particular weapons of mass destruction, from getting into the hands of terrorists. Terrorists could potentially buy or steal a WMD from Russia or from the growing stockpiles of countries like Pakistan (for example the A. Q. Khan network) and Iran. Interdiction programs must be continued and widened. The Proliferation Security Initiative is a step in the right direction; the programs efforts to "interdict the transfer of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to or from states of proliferation concern"[27] will be an important tool, if carried out effectively, in reducing terrorists' capabilities. Other programs, such as the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, must be maintained and updated as needed.

In Graham Allison's book, Nuclear Terrorism, he provides a strategy, which he calls the Seven Yeses, for preventing nuclear terrorism (this strategy could also be applied to preventing CBW attacks). The Seven Yeses are "making the prevention of nuclear terrorism an absolute national priority; fighting a strategically focused war on terrorism; conducting a humble foreign policy; building a global alliance against nuclear terrorism; creating the intelligence capabilities required for success in the war on nuclear terrorism; dealing with dirty bombs; constructing a multilayered defense."[28]

Alexander Diener and Timothy Crawford state that "US policymakers urgently need to create a homeland security strategy that focuses on limiting the damage of terrorism, rather than merely seeking to prevent catastrophic terrorism."[29] In order to reduce the negative effects of terrorism it is necessary to create a robust domestic (the home game) security strategy that not only seeks to prevent an attack but also to mitigate the consequences if an attack does occur. James Smith and Brent Talbot discuss deterrence of an attack through "denial of opportunity" which, they explain, can be achieved by "denying either the victim access to the terrorist through protection and hardening or by denying the terrorist access to the victim or weapon through efforts to block entry and obstruct movement."[30]

Of course, it is impossible to harden every possible target, but through careful planning the most vulnerable targets can be identified and steps taken to protect them. Diener and Crawford explain, "how and where the US spends its precious capital is a critical determinant of whether its homeland security strategy as a whole will succeed or fail."[31]

In order to determine what locations should be given the highest security protection (and the funds that go with that) it is necessary to determine the location's capacity for weaponization and the location's substitutability or redundancy.[32] By weaponization it is meant "elements of national infrastructure that can be used quickly to inflict catastrophic damage if weaponized, " these would include nuclear power plants and chemical processing facilities.[33] Substitutability and redundancy mean that the location's purpose can be fulfilled by similar assets in the area or the purpose can be fulfilled by assets from other segments of the infrastructure (the port of New Orleans is an example of an unsubstitutable location).[34] When this determination is done effectively it will become much easier to identify where the threats lie and how to counter them.

After an attack occurs it is important to quickly identify the perpetrators in order to allow "decisive retribution and a clear chain of movement toward effective prosecution of both perpetrators and their weapons suppliers."[35] Also following an attack, the US must show that it has not let itself be changed. This can be achieved by quick recovery and reconstruction (if necessary), followed by the citizens returning to their normal lives. It is also important to control the level of fear that will result after an attack. As Smith and Talbot say, "terrorism without terror cannot succeed as a political strategy, and failure ultimately will feed on itself, destroying the terrorist cause and effort."[36]

An education program for the public should be provided before an attack explaining the dangers, the terrorist organizations, and what citizens should do in case of an attack. Studies have shown that public education programs have proven quite effective in informing people about the dangers and in changing their behavior.[37] Public education programs, as Diener and Crawford explain, "can 'prime' the public for response to terrorism and other hazards by productively channeling volunteerism, suppressing the spread of panic, and assisting official first-response efforts."[38] When the public is fully informed of the potential threats that they face there will be a much higher chance of the public making responsible choices and actions, both before and after an attack, and there will be an increase in the resilience of the public to strongly rebound after an attack thus lessening its effects.

The US government must create effective liaison capabilities with the media so that it can get accurate information out quickly to the public; the media in turn must refrain from sensationalist reporting in the direct aftermath of an attack. The media can also be used to accentuate the negative aspects of terrorism for propaganda purposes. In particular, the fact that terrorism often kills many innocent victims should be publicized, especially in regions where supporters exist (it should be remembered that supporters are scattered throughout the world, not just in the Middle East).

As part of the campaign against the terrorist ideologies, the US government and media must work to enlighten Arabs/Muslims, etc. about the positive actions that the US has made in the areas in question. Charitable donations, its respect for other religions, its belief in human rights, etc. should be emphasized to counteract the negative image the US has in many quarters of the world. The media should also find leaders in the Middle East (especially religious and other nongovernmental leaders) who speak out against the actions of the terrorist groups. These leaders should be helped to get their message out; their message will also have more of an effect than US arguments since it is coming from a local personage rather than an outsider. These counterarguments from respected local leaders will spread discord within the terrorist organizations. As Sun-Tzu said, "if [the enemy] is internally harmonious, sow divisiveness in his ranks. Attack where he is not prepared."[39]

The idea is not to make the US look weak (as some might argue) but to show its strengths. The hatred that many feel towards the US must be reduced; even the right wing hawks must agree with Machiavelli that "a prince should make himself feared in such a way that, though he does not gain love, he escapes hatred; for being feared but not hated go readily together." The terrorists should fear the US and world's reactions to their attacks, and their justifications for violence must be taken away by a strong counterargument to their ideology.

Smith and Talbot describe the strategic level of deterrence, which they call "deterrence by denial of objectives"[40]. This level involves building a belief in the terrorists' minds that their objectives can not be achieved through terrorism. Thus the terrorists should feel that "their strategy cannot succeed and any action on their part can only leave them exposed to all levels of audience as ineffective, irrelevant, and unworthy of attention or support."[41] Terrorism is primarily "theater" intended to transmit a certain message, if the terrorists feel their intended audiences will not understand what they have done or react negatively then they will search for alternative means of spreading their message.

It is also necessary to constantly review the nation's immigration policies in order to determine whether there is a potential threat. At certain times (for example, during high terrorism threats or all out war), immigration from particular countries may have to be greatly reduced or completely cut off. In addition, profiling techniques (including racial profiling) must be used to identify who are the most likely suspects. Almost all of the terrorists that threaten the US are of similar age and ethnic origins, so it is pure common sense to be more cautious about those who fit the profile.

Early detection systems must be put in place in order to detect possible radiological, biological, and chemical attacks. Early detection will help to minimize the affected areas and casualty rates; it will also foster a quicker response time to attacks and thus help to reduce panic. In the same vein, stockpiles of relevant vaccines and medications must be created and maintained over time. A system must be in place to quickly move the medications to areas of need. Policies must also be in place to determine who will be treated first (i.e. the young and old) and what are the best ways of providing the medication to mass amounts of people in a short amount of time (perhaps, as some have suggested, aerosols sprayed by planes over cities).

While there are many potential security strategies against terrorism, the US must always remember to determine which strategies are the most cost-effective. The government could try to harden all potential targets within the country, but that would be an exorbitant cost and would still not be one-hundred percent effective. Setting up an international image campaign based on diplomacy is thus much cheaper. War should be a last resort, due to its obvious high costs of human life and resources. There will always be a level of uncertainty as to what the terrorists are targeting, this can be filled by good intelligence, but the best solution is to stop the terrorist groups from forming in the first place.

The path to a comprehensive homeland security strategy is by no means an easy task but it is one that can not be ignored. While some call for liberty at all costs, this is not a realistic idea. We live in a dangerous world, with many dangerous people in it, certain liberties must be curtailed (some briefly, some perhaps forever). People must realize that they need to sacrifice for the greater good, for without security there can be nothing else. The security that is provided must be of a permanent nature or, as Benjamin Franklin stated, the people would, in giving up their liberty, "deserve neither liberty nor security."

[1] Dorff, Robert, "The Search for National and Homeland Security, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 29.

[2] Viotti, Paul, "American Foreign Policy and National Security, " (NJ: Pearson Education, 2005): 21.

[3] Tinder, Glenn, "Political Thinking, " (Scott, Foresman and Company, 1986): 25.

[4] Tinder, Glenn, "Political Thinking, " (Scott, Foresman and Company, 1986): 29.

[5] Dorff, Robert, "The Search for National and Homeland Security Strategy, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 21.

[6] Viotti, Paul, "Toward a Comprehensive Strategy for Terrorism and Homeland Security, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 4.

[7] Clausewitz, "On War" in The Book of War, ed. Peters, Ralph, (New York: Random House, 2000): 390.

[8] Sun-Tzu, "The Art of Warfare" in The Book of War, ed. Peters, Ralph, (New York: Random House, 2000): 87.

[9] Machiavelli, Niccolo, "The Prince, " ed. Donno, Daniel, (Bantam Books, NY, 2003): 61-62.

[10] Pape, Robert, Dying to Win, (Random House, NY, 2005).

[11] Smith, James and Talbot, Brent, "Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 61.

[12] Clausewitz, "On War" in The Book of War, ed. Peters, Ralph, (New York: Random House, 2000): 901.

[13] Machiavelli, Niccolo, "The Prince, " ed. Donno, Daniel, (Bantam Books, NY, 2003): 91.

[14] Machiavelli, Niccolo, "The Prince, " ed. Donno, Daniel, (Bantam Books, NY, 2003): 94.

[15] Viotti, Paul, "Toward a Comprehensive Strategy for Terrorism and Homeland Security, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 8-9.

[16] Tinder, Glenn, "Political Thinking, " (Scott, Foresman and Company, 1986): 175.

[17] Viotti, Paul, "American Foreign Policy and National Security, " (NJ: Pearson Education, 2005): 29.

[18] Sun-Tzu, "The Art of Warfare" in The Book of War, ed. Peters, Ralph, (New York: Random House, 2000): 123.

[19] Viotti, Paul, "Toward a Comprehensive Strategy for Terrorism and Homeland Security, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 16.

[20] Sun-Tzu, "The Art of Warfare" in The Book of War, ed. Peters, Ralph, (New York: Random House, 2000): 125.

[21] Viotti, Paul, "Toward a Comprehensive Strategy for Terrorism and Homeland Security, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 5.

[22] Clausewitz, "On War" in The Book of War, ed. Peters, Ralph, (New York: Random House, 2000): 321.

[23] Machiavelli, Niccolo, "The Prince, " ed. Donno, Daniel, (Bantam Books, NY, 2003): 60.

[24] Viotti, Paul, "Toward a Comprehensive Strategy for Terrorism and Homeland Security, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 14-15.

[25] Machiavelli, Niccolo, "The Prince, " ed. Donno, Daniel, (Bantam Books, NY, 2003): 42.

[26] Sun-Tzu, "The Art of Warfare" in The Book of War, ed. Peters, Ralph, (New York: Random House, 2000): 79.

[27] Larsen, Jeffrey and Wirtz, James, "WMD Terrorism, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 113.

[28] Allison, Graham, Nuclear Terrorism, (Henry Holt and Company, NY, 2004): 176-177.

[29] Diener, Alexander and Crawford, Timothy, "Democracy, Civil Society, and the Damage-Limitation Component, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 192.

[30] Smith, James and Talbot, Brent, "Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 56.

[31] Diener, Alexander and Crawford, Timothy, "Democracy, Civil Society, and the Damage-Limitation Component, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 194.

[32] Diener, Alexander and Crawford, Timothy, "Democracy, Civil Society, and the Damage-Limitation Component, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 196.

[33] Diener, Alexander and Crawford, Timothy, "Democracy, Civil Society, and the Damage-Limitation Component, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 196-197.

[34] Diener, Alexander and Crawford, Timothy, "Democracy, Civil Society, and the Damage-Limitation Component, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 197.

[35] Smith, James and Talbot, Brent, "Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 56.

[36] Smith, James and Talbot, Brent, "Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 59.

[37] Mileti et al., "Public Hazards Communication and Education: The State of the Art, " (CO: Institute of Behavior Science Natural Hazards Research and Application Research Center of University of Colorado Boulder, 2003).

[38] Diener, Alexander and Crawford, Timothy, "Democracy, Civil Society, and the Damage-Limitation Component, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 200.

[39] Sun-Tzu, "The Art of Warfare" in The Book of War, ed. Peters, Ralph, (New York: Random House, 2000): 74.

[40] Smith, James and Talbot, Brent, "Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 58.

[41] Smith, James and Talbot, Brent, "Terrorism and Deterrence by Denial, " in Terrorism and Homeland Security, ed. Viotti, Paul, Opheim, Michael, and Bowen, Nicholas, (CRC Press, FL, 2008): 58.